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Road Pricing in Theory and Practice: A Canadian Perspective
David G. Duff* and Carl Irvine+

I.

Introduction

Like other developed countries, Canada experienced massive increases in road
transportation since the end of the Second World War, with substantial growth in the
number of registered vehicles,1 annual per capita distances traveled by automobile,2 and
the volume of goods transported by truck.3 At first, Canadian governments attempted to
match the growing demand for road transportation by improving the quality and capacity
of roads and highways – significantly increasing the extent of paved roadways and
introducing a national highway system supported by federal shared-cost funding.4
Throughout this period, the cost of constructing and maintaining Canada’s road network
was financed mostly from consolidated revenue funds and municipal property taxes,
though federal and municipal governments levied taxes on automotive fuels and
provincial governments collected vehicle registration fees that also contributed to these
revenues.5
Since the 1970s, Canadian governments have been less willing to invest in roads
and highways,6 as growing environmental concerns lessened public enthusiasm for
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1
Between 1945 and 1998, the number of registered vehicles in Canada increased from 1.5 million to almost
18 million. Statistics Canada, Historical Statistics of Canada [Electronic Edition], (Ottawa: Statistics
Canada., 1999) Series T147-194, online at www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/11-516-XIE/sectiona/toc.htm.
2
In 1950, Canadians traveled an average of 1,955 km per capita by car; by 1990, this distance had
quadrupled to 8,230 km per capita. John Pucher and Christian Lefèvre, The Urban Transport Crisis in
Europe and North America, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996) at 162-63.
3
Transport Canada, A Millenium of Transportation in Canada, (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of
Canada, 2000) at 15.[Transport Canada, “A Millenium”]
4
D.R. Owram, “Icons and Albatrosses: Passenger Transportation as Policy And Symbol in Canada,” in
Directions: The Final Report of the Royal Commission on National Passenger Transportation, vol. 3
(Ottawa: Royal Commission on National Passenger Transportation, 1992) at 92-94. From 1945 to 1970,
the total distance of paved public roads in Canada increased from approximately 40,000 two-lane
equivalents to almost 200,000 two-lane equivalents. Transport Canada, Transportation in Canada: 1996
Annual Report, (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 1996), online at
http://www.tc.gc.ca/pol/en/anre/transportation_annual_report.htm at figure 7.1 [Transport Canada, “Annual
Report”].
5
In a few cases, tolls were collected in order to help finance new road construction. In each of these cases,
however, the costs of construction exceeded the revenue from tolls, which were subsequently removed. See
Nancy Bryan, More Taxes, More Traffic, (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation: 1972) at 43-46; and Fred
Nix, Alternative Road Financing Arrangements, Research conducted for the Transportation Act Review,
(March 2001) at 8-10, online at http://www.reviewcta-examenltc.gc.ca/CTAReview/CTAReview/english/
reports/nix.pdf.
6
While municipal financing of roads has continued to increase since the 1960s, provincial and federal
expenditures on roads and highways have declined significantly. Owram, supra note 4 at 129-30.
1

automobiles and urban expressways in particular.7 From 1975 to 1995, the length of
paved roads and highways in Canada increased by approximately 25 percent,8 while the
number of registered vehicles in the country increased by over 50 percent.9 At the same
time, government support for public transit decreased,10 resulting in recurring fare
increases and reduced ridership per capita.11 As a result, road congestion has increased
significantly in Canada, particularly in the largest urban areas (Toronto, Montreal,
Vancouver, Calgary and Edmonton), the “Greater Golden Horseshoe” area surrounding
Toronto, and along the Trans-Canada highway from Windsor (Ontario) to Quebec City.12
In recent years, studies have estimated the annual cost of this congestion at approximately
$2 billion in Toronto,13 almost $800 million in Montreal,14 and between $750 million to
$1.0 billion in Vancouver.15 With a few exceptions during this period, spending on
7

In Ontario, these concerns culminated in the decision to cease construction of the Spadina Expressway in
1971. Similarly in Vancouver, increasing opposition to urban roadways is reflected in public opposition to
a “Third Crossing” of the Burrard Inlet, which began in the 1970s and remains to this day.
8
Transport Canada, “Annual Report”, supra note 4 at Figure 7-1 (indicating that Canada had roughly
250,000 two-lane equivalent kilometres of paved public roads in 1975 and approximately 310,000
kilometres in 1995).
9
The number of registered vehicles in Canada increased from approximately 11.2 million in 1975 to
roughly 17 million in 1995. Statistics Canada, supra note 1 at Series T147-194; Transport Canada, “Annual
Report”, supra note 4 at Figure 10-1.
10
Over the course of the 1980s and early 1990s, the share of the transit operating subsidy financed by
provincial governments in Canada decreased from 53 percent to 42 percent, while the share of the capital
subsidy fell more significantly from 89 percent to 56 percent. Pucher and Lefèvre, supra note 2 at 169.
11
Between 1986 and 1996, rides per capita in Canada’s ten largest cities declined by 21.2 percent. Wendall
Cox, “Overview of Public Transportation in Canada and the United States” (Presentation to the 6th Annual
Conference on Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transportation, Cape Town (September
1999) at 27-28, online at http://www.publicpurpose.com/ut-t6-canus.pdf.
12
See, Jeffrey R. Kenworthy and Felix B. Laube, An International Sourcebook of Automobile Dependence
in Cities 1960-90, (Boulder CO: University Press of Colorado, 1999); and Neil Irwin, et. al., Urban
Transportation Indicators – 1996 Survey 2, (Ottawa: Transportation Association of Canada, 1999). For
more detailed studies of congestion in Toronto, see Mary Rubinstein, Nancy Mudrinic, and Bruce
McCuaig, “Greater Toronto Area Transportation Plan” (Paper for the 1996 Annual Conference of the
Transportation Association of Canada, Charlottown, Prince Edward Island, 1996) (reporting that volumeto-capacity ratios for highways and arterial roads into Metropolitan Toronto from surrounding regions were
already 0.94, 0.96 and 1.40 by 1991, and predicted to increase to 1.20, 1.64 and 1.83 by 2021 barring any
major expansion to the road network); and IBI Group and Hemson Consulting Ltd., Funding
Transportation in the Greater Toronto Area and Hamilton-Wentworth: Report to the Transport Funding
Opportunities Taskforce, (Toronto, April 1999) (reporting that the proportion of the expressway system in
the Greater Toronto Area and Hamilton-Wentworth with volume-to-capacity ratios exceeding 0.95
increased from 10 percent in 1981 to 70 percent by 1998). In Montreal, the number of vehicle hours
resulting from delays due to congestion (where travel speeds are less than 60 percent of free-flow speeds)
during the morning rush-hour increased from 21.5 percent in 1993 to 25.8 percent in 1998. Louis Gourvil
and Fannie Joubert, Evaluation de la Congestion Routiere Dans La Region de Montreal, (Quebec City:
Transport Quebec, 2004) at 57, online at http://www1.mtq.gouv.qc.ca/fr/ministere/recherche/etudes/
congestion.asp. In Vancouver, a recent study estimates that 13.6 percent of urban vehicle kilometres
traveled in 2002 occurred in congested conditions, a figure that is predicted to increase to 15 percent by
2006. British Columbia Ministry of Transportation, Service Plan: Ministry of Transportation 2004/05 20006/07, (Victoria: Ministry of Transportation, 2004) at 31, online at www.gov.bc.ca/trans.
13
Canadian Urban Transit Association (CUTA), Issue Paper No.5: Transit Means Business: The Economic
Case for Public Transit: Executive Summary (2003) at 5, online at www.cutaactu.ca .
14
Gourvil and Joubert, supra note 12 at ix.
15
Greater Vancouver Regional District, 2005-2007 Three Year Plan & Ten-Year Outlook. (Vancouver:
Greater Vancouver Regional Authority, 2004) at 8, online at www.translink.bc.ca.
2

Canada’s roads and highways has continued to be financed from general revenues
(including gasoline taxes and vehicle registration fees) rather than dedicated taxes or user
charges.16
In order to finance improvements to road and transit infrastructure and address the
growing problem of road congestion in Canada, federal and provincial governments have
introduced and proposed a number of measures. In Montreal and Vancouver, provincial
legislation has established urban transport agencies, which obtain additional revenues for
municipal transportation through fuel taxes collected within the urban area, vehicle
licence fees, and sales taxes on paid parking.17 At the provincial level, governments have
promised increased funding for urban public transit and plan to implement high
occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes as an incentive for people to carpool.18 At the federal
level, all major federalist parties are committed to sharing a portion of the federal
gasoline tax with municipalities in order to finance new infrastructure projects.19 Notably
absent from these measures, however, are any concrete proposals to introduce more
explicit road prices in the form of tolls and congestion-related charges.
This paper hopes to contribute to Canadian public policy by making a case for
increased reliance on explicit charges for the use of Canada’s roads and highways. Part II
considers road pricing in theory, considering the main arguments for and against road
user charges as well as their optimal design. Part III reviews international experience with
road pricing in order to derive lessons for the Canadian context. Part IV offers tentative
conclusions.
16

Major exceptions include the Coquihalla highway in British Columbia, a toll highway that opened in
1986; the Saskatchewan Transportation Partnership Fund, under which a dedicated levy is imposed on
heavy vehicles operating in the province; the Confederation Bridge linking Prince Edward Island to the
mainland, which was partly financed through tolls; and Highway 407 north of Toronto, an all-electronic
open access toll highway constructed as a public-private partnership and sold to a private consortium in
1999. See Nix, supra note 5 at 22-24 and 29-31.
17
See CUTA, supra note 13 at 6 and 12. In Montreal, the Agence metropolitaine de transport (AMT)
receives 1.5 cents per litre from provincial gasoline tax for sales in the area as well as $30 per vehicle from
the provincial licence fee. In Vancouver, the regional transportation authority (TransLink) receives 11 cents
per litre from the provincial fuel tax (which is higher in the Vancouver area) as well as provincial sales tax
on parking in the area. While provincial legislation permits TransLink to levy other charges, such as
vehicle charges, parking charges and toll charges, the transportation authority has yet to introduce such
charges.
18
See, e.g., Government of Ontario, Places to Grow: Better Choices. Brighter Future. A Growth Plan for
the Greater Golden Horseshoe, (Discussion Paper, Summer 2004) at 29-31, online at http://
www.placestogrow.pir.gov.on.ca/userfiles/HTML/nts_2_20438_1.html .
19
See, e.g., Liberal Party of Canada, Moving Canada Forward: The Paul Martin Plan for Getting Things
Done (Liberal Party Campaign Platform, 2004 Federal Election) at 31, online at http://www.liberal.ca/
platform_en.pdf (promising to share up to 5 cents per litre of the 10 cent per litre federal tax within five
years). The New Democratic Party campaign platform also promised to share half the federal gas tax with
municipalities “for sustainable transportation, public transit, cycling and pedestrian infrastructure” in cities
and “freight rail and road investment in rural communities”: New Democratic Party of Canada (NDP), New
Energy.
A
Positive
Choice,
(Campaign
Platform
2004)
at
5,
online
at
http://www.ndp.ca/uploaded/20040527091443_Fed.NDP.Platform.eng.sm.pdf. The Conservative Party
platform promised to share at least 3 cents per litre of the federal gasoline tax with municipalities:
Conservative Party of Canada, Demanding Better (Conservative Platform 2004) at 19, online at
http://www.conservative.ca/platform/e.pdf. At the time of writing, it remains unclear which, if any, of these
policies will be implemented and over what time frame.
3

II. Road Pricing in Theory
In order to evaluate options for increased reliance on road user charges it is
helpful to begin by considering road pricing in theory – reviewing the main arguments for
and against road user charges as well as their optimal design. As a foundation for the
review of actual experience with road pricing in Part III of this paper, the following
sections provide this theoretical framework.
A. Arguments for and Against Road User Charges
As with arguments for user fees and benefit taxes more generally,20 arguments for
increased reliance on road user charges emphasize both economic efficiency and
fairness.21 Arguments against road pricing tend to appeal to similar objectives –
contending that road user charges are actually inefficient and unfair.22 This section
considers both sets of arguments.
1.

Efficiency

The main argument in favour of road pricing is that user charges promote
economic efficiency.23 As a normative principle, economic efficiency favours the
allocation of scarce resources to their most highly valued uses in order to maximize
aggregate welfare.24 By ensuring that drivers face the full costs attributable to their use of
the road system, road user charges promote economic efficiency by ensuring that those
who choose to drive value their use of the road system at an amount equal to or greater
than its cost. Persons who value use of the road system at an amount less than this cost,
on the other hand, will choose not to drive – preventing the wasteful allocation of scarce
resources to a use for which people are not willing to pay.
In order to promote economic efficiency, economic analysis suggests that road
prices should be set at an amount equal to the marginal costs attributable to each driver’s
20

See, e.g Richard M. Bird and Thomas Tsiopoulos, “User Charges for Public Services: Potntials and
Problems” (1997), 45 Canadian Tax Journal 25-86; Mark Sproule-Jones, “User Fees” in Allan M.
Maslove, ed., Taxes as Instruments of Public Policy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press in cooperation
with the Fair Tax Commission of the Government of Ontario, 1994) 3-38; and David G. Duff, “Benefit
Taxes and User Fees in Theory and Practice” (2004), 54 University of Toronto Law Journal 391.
21
See, e.g., European Commission, Towards Fair and Efficient Pricing in Transport Policy Options for
Internalising the External Cost of Transport in the European Union, Green Paper (1995), online at
http://europa.eu.int/en/record/green/gp003en.pdf (emphasizing “fair and efficient” road pricing); and
Commission for Integrated Transport (CfIT), Paying for Road Use, (February 2002) at 10, online at
http://www.cfit.gov.uk/reports/pfru/pdf/pfru.pdf at 10 (describing road pricing as “Fairer, Smarter and
More Efficient”).
22
For a useful summary of common objections to road pricing, see Robert Atkinson, “The Role of Road
Pricing in Reducing Traffic Congestion” Testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S.
Congress (May 6, 2004), online at http://www.ppionline.org/ndol/print.cfm?contentid=251568.
23
See, e.g., Chris Nash, Peter Mackie, Jeremy Shires, and John Nellthorp, The Economic Efficiency Case
for Road User Charging (July 20, 2004), online at http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft_roads/
documents/page/dft_roads_029765.pdf.
24
While the measure of value employed for this purpose might be based on happiness or utility, economic
analysis invariably dismisses these standards as indeterminate or unmeasurable, relying instead on more
objective measures like willingness-to-pay. Within this framework, therefore, scarce resources should be
allocated among different uses according to the relative amounts that people in aggregate are prepared to
pay.
4

use of the road system – that is, the additional costs resulting from each person’s decision
to drive. Assuming that these marginal costs (MC) increase as the number of drivers
increases, and that aggregate demand for road use (D) increases as the price (P) for this
use decreases, Figure 1 illustrates that economic efficiency is achieved at a price (Pe) and
a quantity of road use (Qe) where the amount that an additional driver is willing to pay to
use the road system (D) is equal marginal cost resulting from that person’s use of the
system (MC). At a price that is lower than this amount (e.g. at P1), the marginal cost
attributable to an additional person’s use of the road system (Q1b) exceeds the amount
that this person is willing to pay for this use (Q1a), indicating that scarce resources
attributable to this use could be employed more efficiently elsewhere.25 On the other
hand, where the price charged for using the road system exceeds this amount (e.g. at P2),
the amount that potential drivers are willing to pay to use the road system (Q2c) exceeds
the costs associated with this use (Q2d), suggesting that increased use of the road system
is economically efficient.
Figure 1
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Without some form of road pricing, users incur only private costs associated with
their use of the road system, such as vehicle costs (capital and maintenance costs),
insurance costs, the cost of fuel, and the cost of time spent driving. Absent from their
decisions regarding the use of the road system are so-called “external” costs such as the
cost of constructing and maintaining roads, the opportunity cost of the land on which the
roads are located, environmental costs resulting from vehicle emissions, accident costs
that are not internalized through insurance premiums, and increased travel times resulting
from congestion. When these external costs are added to the private costs attributable to
road use, the aggregate reflects the real social costs resulting from this use. As Figure 2
illustrates, by failing to account for these external costs, decisions based on marginal
private costs of road use (MPC) result in a level of road use (Q1) at which the marginal
25

The measure of the resulting “deadweight loss” is defined by the area eab.
5

social costs (MSC) resulting from an additional person’s use of the road system (Q1b)
exceed the amount that this person would be willing to pay for this use (Q1a), suggesting
that scarce resources attributable to this use could be employed more efficiently in other
ways. The measure of this inefficiency (and the social benefit resulting from efficient
road pricing) is defined by the area eab, and the road price that must be collected in order
to promote an efficient level of road use (RP) is defined by the distance ce.

Figure 2
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Figure 2 illustrates only one of at least three inefficiencies resulting from an
absence of direct charges for use of roads and highways. In addition, since the resulting
demand for road use is apt to produce congestion and demands for greater road capacity
in order to alleviate this congestion, a lack of efficient road prices can lead to inefficiently
large investments in road capacity.26 As well, roads and highways that are not financed
through user charges must be financed through general taxes which can themselves
produce inefficiencies by distort economic behaviour. For all these reasons, therefore, it
is not surprising that economists and policy-makers generally advocate road pricing
arrangements based on marginal social costs.27
Despite these efficiency arguments in favour of road user charges, it is important
to recognize that road pricing can itself entail significant costs in terms of administration
26

See, e.g., Richard M. Bird, Charging for Public Services: A New Look at an Old Idea, Canadian Tax
Paper No. 59, (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1976) [Bird, Charging] at 51-52, emphasizing that
“[o]ne of the most significant consequences of an incorrect pricing policy is an incorrect investment
policy”.
27
For a useful summary of this literature, see Esko Niskanen, Nicole Adler, Joseph Berechman, Jan K.
Brueckner, David Milne, Chris Nash, Stef Proost, and Erik Verhoef, The MC-ICAM (Implementation of
Marginal Cost Pricing in Transport – Integrated Conceptual and Applied Model Analysis) Approach to
Pricing in Transport, (7 August 2001), online at http://www.strafica.fi/mcicam/handouts/
DELIVERABLES/del1.pdf.
6

and enforcement by authorities charged with establishing and collecting these charges, as
well as compliance costs incurred by users themselves. Among arguments against road
pricing, a common objection is that the various costs that must be incurred in order to
implement more direct road charges are likely to exceed the economic benefits resulting
from these charges. Indeed, proponents themselves acknowledge that since more direct
road user charging would generally involve significant change, “[t]he economics require
it to be demonstrated that the costs of change – including the capital and running costs of
the charging system itself – are significantly outweighed by the benefits.”28
While the specific costs and benefits of any road pricing arrangement are
empirical matters that depend on the specific form of the pricing scheme and its impact
on actual behaviour, there are three reasons to expect that this efficiency argument
against road pricing is probably mistaken. First, studies that have attempted to estimate
the marginal social cost of road use in different countries generally concur that these
costs significantly exceed the various costs that road users typically bear.29 Second,
evidence from modeling studies and actual experience with road user charges suggests
that road pricing can have a significant impact on behaviour.30 Third, as the various
examples in Part III illustrate, technological developments such as electronic
transponders, automatic vehicle identification (AVI), and global positioning systems
(GPS) make it increasingly possible to collect economically efficient road user charges
without the need for costly collection systems such as traditional tollbooths. On
efficiency grounds, therefore, the case for increased road pricing seems to be pretty well
established.
2.

Fairness

In addition to these efficiency arguments for road user charges, road pricing is
often promoted on fairness grounds, on the basis that those who use roads and highways
should bear the costs associated with this use.31 Reflecting the so-called “benefit
principle” of taxation, this view of fairness suggests that those who use publicly-provided
goods and services should pay for this use in the same way that consumers must pay for
the goods and services that they purchase in the marketplace.32 On this basis, it follows,
road users should pay for the cost of constructing and maintaining roads, as well as other
external costs associated with driving such as environmental costs and lost time
attributable to congestion.
28

Nash et. al., supra note 23 at 3.
See, e.g., Todd Litman, Socially Optimal Transport Prices and Markets: Principles, Strategies and
Impacts, (Victoria, B.C.: Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 1999) at 12, available at
http://www.vtpi.org/opprice.pdf (estimating that external costs associated with road transportation in
Canada account for 32 percent of total costs); and Tom Sansom, Chris Nash, Peter Mackie, Jeremy Shires,
and Paul Watkiss, Surface Transport Costs and Charges, (Institute for Transport Studies, University of
Leeds,
2001),
available
at
http://www.its.leeds.ac.uk/projects/STCC/downloads/
SurfaceTransportCostsReport.pdf (determining that marginal social costs for the average road user in Great
Britain exceed road revenues by 100% or more).
30
See the summary of these studies and experiments in Nash et. al., supra note 23 at 12-21.
31
See, e.g., European Commission, supra note 21. A related argument favours road pricing as a way to
prevent unfair competition between road transportation and other modes.
32
See, e.g., Sproule-Jones, supra note 20 at 8-11; and Bird, supra note 26 at 11 (observing that the benefit
principle of taxation reflects “the commercial principle that it is only fair to pay for what you get”).
29
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As a concept of tax fairness, the benefit principle generally competes with another
principle according to which taxes and other public levies should be allocated according
to each person’s “ability to pay”.33 Although the precise definition of this concept is by
no means uncontroversial,34 it is often assumed that a person’s ability to pay is best
measured by that person’s income broadly defined.35 Taxation according to ability to pay
is also generally assumed to require progressive taxation, involving proportionately
higher taxes at higher income levels, on the basis that the effective burden of a fixed tax
rate decreases as income increases due to a diminishing marginal utility of income.36 To
the extent that road user charges impose a greater proportionate financial burden on
persons with lower incomes, therefore, this conception of fairness suggests that they are
unfair.37
In order to decide between the benefit and ability to pay principles, it is important
to consider the purpose for which revenues are raised. Where this purpose is to
redistribute resources or to finance the provision of a good or service that is either
generally distributed according to right, need or merit (e.g., basic education, medical care
and higher education) or difficult to limit to specific beneficiaries (e.g. national defence),
the benefit principle is inappropriate or impractical and taxation according to ability to
pay may be justified.38 In contrast, where governments provide a good or service the
benefits of which are largely private, the provision of which is intended neither to
redistribute resources nor to satisfy a basic right, and the distribution of which can be
limited to specific beneficiaries, the benefit principle constitutes an appropriate and
feasible approach to public finance.39
Although there are undoubtedly public benefits to the expansion of road networks
as all users benefit from increased potential interchange,40 the benefits from the actual use
33

For useful discussions of these two principles of tax fairness, see Richard A. Musgrave, Peggy B.
Musgrave, and Richard M. Bird, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 1st Cdn. ed. (Toronto: McGrawHill Ryerson, 1987) at 209-28; and Robin W. Boadway and Harry M. Kitchen, Canadian Tax Policy, 3rd
edn., Canadian Tax Paper No. 103, (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1999) at 86-88.
34
See, e.g., Alvin Warren, “Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?” (1980), 89 Yale
Law Journal 1081 at 1092 (criticizing the concept as lacking specific content).
35
See, e.g., Boadway and Kitchen, supra note 33 at 53. For a prominent definition of personal income for
this purpose, see Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1938).
36
See, e.g., Musgrave, Musgrave and Bird, supra note 33 at 214-18. In addition to this rationale,
progressive taxation may also be justified more directly on the basis that it promotes a particular conception
of distributive justice by reducing pre-tax inequalities in the distribution of income. See, e.g., Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, “The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction”
(1987), 86 Michigan Law Review 465); and Neil Brooks, “Flattening the Claims of the Flat Taxers” (1998),
21 Dalhousie L.J. 287.
37
See, e.g., David L. Flewelling, “CAA urges Federal Government to support ‘most promising measures’
for climate change” (6 June 2002), online at http://www.caa.ca/e/news-issues/btw/2002/btw-02-0606.shtml (arguing among other things that road tolls “would impose a significant increased financial burden
on lower income earners”).
38
See the discussion in Duff, supra note 20 at 405-07.
39
See ibid. at 410-13.
40
Richard M. Bird, “User Charges: An Old Idea Revisited” in Richard Krever, ed., Tax Conversations: A
Guide to the Key Issues in the Tax Reform Debate, (London: Kluwer Law International, 1997) 513 at 52021 [Bird, “User Charges”]. Although it is also suggested that road networks generate positive externalities
8

of roads and highways are largely private and may be attributed to individual users
through methods such as electronic tolling.41 Nor can it be said that the primary purpose
of public roads and highways is to redistribute resources, though redistributive
considerations may motivate access in sparsely-populated areas and remote communities
and among specific groups such as elderly and disabled persons. Nor is equal access to all
roads and highways generally regarded as a basic right in the same way that many view
access to basic education and medical care. For these reasons, it seems reasonable to
conclude that the benefit principle is better suited to financing road and highways than
taxation according to ability to pay.
With respect to the distributional impact of road user charges, moreover, it is not
at all clear that they would in fact impose a greater proportionate financial burden on
persons with lower incomes than on persons with higher incomes. On the contrary, data
suggesting that persons with lower incomes are less likely to own automobiles and drive
less on average suggest that road user charges may be mildly progressive.42 Furthermore,
in assessing the distributional implications of any reform involving increased reliance on
direct road user charges, it is important to consider not only the incidence of these
charges themselves but also the incidence of other taxes or levies that might be reduced at
the same time and the distributional impact of public expenditures toward which any
increased revenues might be devoted. Where a shift to direct road user charges is
accompanied by reductions in regressive taxes (e.g., sales taxes) or increased
expenditures on public goods and services from which lower-income persons derive
greater proportionate benefit (e.g. public transit), the overall impact may be highly
progressive.43
Even if the impact of increased road pricing on various regions or groups of
people is considered unfair, these concerns can be addressed through targeted measures,
such as lower charges in remote regions, for low-income drivers, or for elderly and

in the form of increased productivity and economic growth, evidence suggests that these benefits tend to be
internalized in the form of lower transport costs. European Commission, supra note 21 at 7.
41
Werner Rothengatter, "Do External Benefits Compensate for External Costs?" (1994), 28A
Transportation Research 321.
42
According to a recent Canadian study, the percentage of household income devoted to private
transportation is estimated to increase over the lowest three quintiles of the income distribution, suggesting
that road user charges would be progressive over this range. Todd Litman, Social Inclusion as a Transport
Planning Issue in Canada, (Victoria: Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2003) at 17, available at
http://www.vtpi.org/soc_ex.pdf (reporting that 53 percent of households in the lowest income quintile
owned no vehicle, 41 percent owned one vehicle, and 6 percent owned two or more vehicles; that 23
percent of households in the second income quintile owned no vehicle, 57 percent owned one vehicle, and
19 percent owned two or more vehicles; that 12 percent of households in the third income quintile owned
no vehicle, 53 percent owned one vehicle, and 35 percent owned two or more vehicles; that 8 percent of
households in the fourth income quintile owned no vehicle, 43 percent owned one vehicle, and 49 percent
owned two or more vehicles; and that 7 percent of households in the highest income quintile owned no
vehicle, 30 percent owned one vehicle, and 63 percent owned two or more vehicles).
43
See, e.g., Harry W. Richardson and Chang-Hee Christine Bae, “The Equity Impacts of Road Congestion
Pricing” in Kenneth J. Button, and Erik T. Verthoef eds., Road Pricing, Traffic, Congestion, and the
Environment, (Northampton MA: Edward Elgar, 1998) 247 at 248.
9

disabled persons.44 Since these measures are likely to lessen the scheme’s efficiencyenhancing effects and certain to increase costs of administration and compliance,
however, it is preferable to address these distributive concerns through other instruments
such as general tax and benefit programs. Where these are designed in order to ensure a
fair distribution of all taxes and expenditures, there should be no reason to oppose road
user charges on fairness grounds.
B. Optimal Design of Road User Charges
If road pricing is to promote economic efficiency and fairness, it is essential not
only that road user charges be levied in some form, but that they be set at an appropriate
amount. As the earlier discussion of economic efficiency suggests, efficient road prices
should be based on marginal social costs, reflecting the difference between these costs
and marginal private costs. The key external costs for this purpose include the cost of
constructing and maintaining roads, the opportunity cost of the land on which the roads
are located, environmental costs resulting from vehicle emissions, accident costs that are
not internalized through insurance premiums, and increased travel times resulting from
congestion.45
In estimating marginal social costs, it is important to distinguish between shortrun marginal costs when infrastructure is assumed to be fixed, and long-run marginal
costs which allow for changes in road capacity. While construction and opportunity costs
play a key role in the computation of long-run marginal costs, short-run marginal costs
include only operating and maintenance costs, environmental costs, accident costs, and
congestion costs.46 Of external short-run marginal costs, studies suggest that the largest
component is the cost of congestion.47
As a general rule, economic efficiency requires that road user charges should be
based on short-run marginal costs in order to make the most efficient use of existing
infrastructure.48 Where long-run marginal costs exceed short-run marginal costs,
however, economically efficient road user charges may have to exceed short-run
marginal costs in order to obtain sufficient revenues to finance an optimal level of
infrastructure.49 Where short-run marginal costs exceed long-run marginal costs, on the
other hand, economic analysis suggests that it is efficient to use road user charges to
finance investments in increased capacity.50 Where urban development makes increases
44
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in road capacity impractical, however, public investments in alternative modes of travel
(e.g., public transit and bicycle lanes) are warranted.
In calculating marginal costs attributable to the use of roads and highways, it is
important to emphasize that these are not simply financial or accounting costs, but
economic or opportunity costs – that is, the economic value of the benefits that could
have been obtained had the scarce resources devoted to the use of the road been devoted
to their most highly valued purpose.51 As these costs are often not observable from
market transactions, they may be extremely difficult to determine in order to establish
economically efficient prices.52 To the extent that marginal costs vary according to the
level of output, moreover, the implementation of economically efficient road user charges
requires not only a determination of marginal costs at different levels of output, but also
an assessment of the impact of different charges on demand for road use.53
As Figure 3 illustrates, for example, where the marginal costs attributable to the
use of a road or highway increase as use of the road or highway increases, economically
efficient pricing depends on aggregate willingness-to-pay or demand for the road or
highway as well as marginal costs attributable to this use. Where the price that is initially

Figure 3
SRMC

P

C1
P2

C2
P1

D

Q

established for use of the road or highway is greater or less than the efficient price,
however, excess or insufficient supply relative to demand should provide signals to adjust
prices to a more efficient level. Where the price is too low (e.g., at P1), the short-run
marginal cost attributable to the use of the road or highway (C1) exceeds the price,
suggesting that the price should be increased. In contrast, where the price is too high
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(e.g., at P2), the amount that is collected from each user exceeds the short-run marginal
cost attributable to the use of the road or highway (C2), suggesting that the price should
be lowered. As a result, even incorrect road user charges can help point the way toward
correct road user charges.
In addition to these challenges to the implementation of economically efficient
road prices, two others should be mentioned. First, where not all goods and services are
priced on a marginal cost basis, it may be economically inefficient to implement marginal
cost pricing in all circumstances.54 To the extent that urban drivers do not incur the full
marginal social costs of driving, for example, it would be economically inefficient to set
public transit fares equal to the marginal cost of each trip.55 On the contrary, as Richard
Bird has explained, the objective in these circumstances should be “to establish roughly
the same deviation between price and cost in all sectors.”56
Second, where road use provides more general benefits beyond those available to
the direct user, economically efficient rates should be adjusted to account for these
positive externalities.57 In these circumstances, economic analysis suggests that road
users should be charged only a portion of marginal social costs, with the remainder
financed by general taxes.58 Although the expansion of road networks presumably
generates some public benefits as all users benefit from increased potential interchange,59
evidence suggests that any other external benefits from road use are internalized in the
form of lower transport costs.60 As a result, while it might be economically efficient to
subsidize the cost of network expansions from general revenues, there appears to be little
economic justification for subsidizing road use more generally.
In practice, the various challenges to the determination of economically efficient
road user charges make it unrealistic to assume that perfectly efficient prices are likely to
be implemented in the real world.61 Nonetheless, as Richard Bird and Thomas Tsiopoulos
conclude, “it is better to be roughly “right” – that is, to charge some form of roughly
economically sensible price … – than to be clearly wrong.”62 The remainder of this
article attempts to demonstrate that more “economically sensible” road prices are not
merely theoretical concepts, but practical possibilities.
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III. Road Pricing in Practice
In Canada and other developed countries, most road-related user charges and
benefit taxes take the form of driver and vehicle registration fees and taxes on automotive
fuels. As a general rule, vehicle registration fees vary according to the type of the vehicle,
distinguishing between passenger vehicles and heavy goods vehicles for which the
marginal costs of road use are much greater. In many countries, registration fees also vary
according to the fuel efficiency of the vehicle, establishing a form of user charge for
external environmental costs.63 Automotive fuel taxes are increasingly differentiated
according to external environmental costs,64 and are obviously related to road use –
which is positively correlated to fuel consumption.
While these registration fees and automotive fuel taxes constitute a form of road
pricing, however, there are several reasons to question the efficiency of these prices.
First, in several countries, the level of these charges is much less than reasonable
estimates of the marginal external costs associated with road use.65 More significantly,
perhaps, the structure of existing road prices is only weakly related to marginal external
costs, which depend on axle weight and configuration as well as distances traveled,66
weakly related to external environmental costs which depend on fuel type, vehicle and
engine type, and driving patterns (location, speed and acceleration) as well as fuel
consumption,67 weakly related to external accident costs which depend on risk factors as
well as driving frequency, and largely unrelated to congestion costs which depend on the
type of vehicle, the time of day, and the place where it is driven.68 Of these external costs,
studies suggest that the most significant is the cost of lost time from congestion.69
The following sections consider alternative method of road pricing, reviewing
experience with these methods in various jurisdictions. This experience suggests that road
user charges can take many forms other than registration fees and automotive fuel taxes.
63
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A. Toll Facilities
The oldest form of road pricing, toll facilities have existed in various forms for
centuries. Indeed, before the expansion of road networks during the twentieth century,
many if not most “highways” were built as toll roads.70 Many jurisdictions continue to
use tolls as a means of financing roads and other facilities like bridges and tunnels,
though generally not as a means of controlling congestion.71 In Canada, the 1950’s and
60’s saw a brief revival of tolls as a means of financing roads and facilities in Canada,
while provincial governments, facing increasing financing pressures again turned to tolls
as a means of financing roads in the 1990’s.72
For the most part, these toll roads and facilities employ traditional collection
methods involving manual toll booths and automatic coin machines. Relatively costly to
administer, these methods restrict traffic flows and require considerable space for toll
plazas, making them ill-suited for congestion charging.73 In a few cases where variable
charges have been introduced on existing toll facilities, however, traffic flows have
demonstrated a noticeable response to these price signals. In France, for example, traffic
volumes on the Autoroute du Nord A1 between Paris and Lille during the peak Sunday
afternoon period decreased by 4.4 to 8.2 percent after charges for this period were
increased by 25 to 56 percent and charges for Sunday mornings and evenings were
reduced by a comparable amount.74 In South Korea, traffic volume in two tunnels leading
into downtown Seoul decreased by over 10 percent when tolls on vehicles with less than
three passengers were increased during weekday mornings from 7 am to 9 am and on
Saturdays from 7 am to 3 pm, allowing average traffic speed in the tunnels to increase
from 21.6 km/hr to 29.8 km/hr.75 Likewise, in the United States, the introduction of
variable tolls on six bridges and tunnels to Manhattan in March 2001 caused a noticeable
reduction in traffic during peak morning and evening periods.76 Although increased peak
period tolls in Seoul appear to have caused an initial increase in traffic volume on
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alternate routes,77 the main response to these differential charges has been a shift from
peak period travel to off-peak use.78 In Seoul, where higher peak period toll charges
applied only to vehicles with less than three passengers, increased car pooling was also
reported.79
In contrast to manual toll booths and automatic coin machines, automatic vehicle
identification (AVI) technologies provide greater potential for economically sensible road
pricing. Administratively less costly than traditional collection methods, AVI
technologies require no additional space for toll plazas and operate without any
restriction on traffic flow, making them ideal instruments for congestion-based road
pricing.80 Although automatic tolling involving AVI technologies can raise privacy
concerns,81 these can be greatly alleviated through smart card technologies which
automatically deduct applicable charges from refillable smart cards as vehicles enter and
exit tolled facilities, making it unnecessary to maintain records of driving patterns except
as an enforcement measure where drivers have not purchased a card.82
Three of the most notable experiments with automatic tolling of roads using AVI
technologies are the Highway 407 Express Toll Route (ETR) in Toronto and express toll
lanes in San Diego and Orange County, California. The remainder of this section reviews
each of these experiments.
1.

407 Express Toll Route, Toronto

The Highway 407 Express Tool Route (ETR) project is a 108-kilometer toll road
that runs north of Toronto. It was built and operated as part of a public/private partnership
with the provincial government. Although the government had originally hoped to find a
private partner to finance, build, and operate the road, it ultimately ended up financing
the road publicly, with the private partner operating the road.83 The road was completed
in 1997, although it has since been extended, with current plans to extend it again. In
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1999, the Provincial government leased the road to an international consortium to run the
project for 99 years.84
The 407 ETR uses electronic road pricing technology to allow it to operate
without tollbooths. Regular users of the 407 can purchase transponders that tell the
tracking system when their vehicle enters and exits the highway, allowing it to bill them
accordingly. Vehicles without transponders are billed using a video-based technology
that matches the vehicle’s license plate with the Motor Vehicle Registry database and
sends the owner (though not necessarily the driver) a monthly bill.85
The 407 ETR uses a variable price schedule, with vehicles charged on a perkilometer basis and charges based on the time of day. Originally, there were three distinct
periods and associated prices. During peak hours, vehicles were charged 10 cents (CAN)
per km. During non-peak and weekend daytime hours, the charge was 7 cents (CAN) per
km, while the charge was 4 cents per km at night.86 In January 2002, the 407 ETR briefly
switched to a flat pricing scheme of 11.5 cents per km at all times, but it has since shifted
back to a variable pricing scheme, with only two prices instead of three.87 The ETR also
has higher prices for trucks, to reflect the higher cost imposed on the highway by trucks,
with the rate for trucks set at two times that for cars (three times for double-trailers).
Although the 407 is privately operated, the tolls are regulated by the provincial
government, and can only be increased with inflation, or if there is an increase in traffic
volume above certain target levels. Interestingly, in this case, the government seems to
encourage higher overall traffic levels on the 407, presumably to reduce congestion levels
on the free alternative.88
Although there appear to have been no academic studies of the impact of variable
charges on traffic demand on the 407, it is interesting to consider what happened to traffic
flows when the 407 was first opened. For the first 4 months of its operation the highway
operated without tolls, attracting a daily volume of approximately 300,000 vehicles.
However, when the tolls were introduced, traffic declined to less than 200,000 vehicles
per day.89 Since then, traffic volume on the 407 ETR has expanded to over 300,000
vehicles per day, although over the same time, the road length has also increased
substantially (from approximately 68 km to 108km).90 One reason for the sharp initial
decline in volume after the introduction of tolls is probably the proximity of a free, if
congested, alternative to the 407, which may also explain the political viability of the 407
ETR.91
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2.

I-15 Value Pricing Demonstration Project, San Diego

In 1988, an 8-mile long reversible high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lane was
opened along the I-15, a major commuter route northeast of San Diego. Early experience
with the exclusive carpool lane was disappointing, with peak-hour volumes well below
1,000 vehicles per lane, while the regular highway remained highly congested.92 At the
same time, a local mayor, who would ultimately become a state legislator, was seeking a
means of financing public transit service to his community located along this route. The
result was a plan to sell off the unused capacity to single occupancy vehicles, in order to
use the revenue to finance a new express bus route along this highway. The plan
coincided with interest by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) in using road
pricing as a means of controlling congestion, which meant that the initial demonstration
project was funded by the FHWA.93
The initial phase, ExpressPass, involved selling a limited number of monthly
permits on a first-come, first-served basis. Drivers with a permit, displayed on their
windshield, could use the HOV lanes during all operating hours without meeting the
HOV requirement of two or more passengers.94 The permits were colored decals
displayed in the windshield, and were enforced by the police by visual inspection.
Initially 500 permits were sold at a price of $50 per month, but demand was so high that
both the number of permits and the price were subsequently increased to 700 and $70
respectively. By the end of the ExpressPass phase the number of permits had been
increased to 1,000, although there still remained a waiting list for permits.95 While, single
occupant vehicles had to have a permit to use the lanes, vehicles with two or more
passengers could continue to use the lanes free of charge.
The early results of the ExpressPass phase were fairly positive. Although a flat
monthly fee may not appear to be a form of congestion pricing, using the HOV lane only
makes sense during congested travel. As a result, the program operates as a crude form of
congestion pricing.96 During the first 3 months of the demonstration, traffic volume on
the HOV lanes increased by 12 percent.97 Ironically, though, single occupancy use of the
lane actually fell while HOV use increased. Whereas before ExpressPass was introduced
15 percent of the carpool user were single occupancy vehicles using the lanes illegally,
after the introduction of ExpressPass, high occupancy vehicles accounted for 88 percent
of users while ExpressPass permit users accounted for 10 percent, and illegal users
accounted for only 2 percent.98 The decline in illegal users was likely due to increased
police monitoring (for the ExpressPass permits) as well as a legal alternative in the form
of the permits.
Several explanations have been presented for why HOV use increased when
ExpressPass was introduced. One explanation is that, as a result of the pricing program,
drivers got a more tangible sense of the cost savings offered by carpooling. A second is
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that increased enforcement of the HOV lane encouraged drivers to carpool rather than
pay for the permit or use the lane illegally. Finally, it has been suggested the people were
more willing to commit to a carpool, since they knew they could still occasionally obtain
the timesavings by buying into the lane. This latter explanation is consistent with the
observation that 45 percent of permits were used on an occasional or periodic basis.99
After a transitional period the ExpressPass phase of the project shifted to the
FasTrak phase in the spring of 1998. In this phase, variable fees were collected
electronically from single occupancy vehicles in the HOV lane. The fee was (and
remains) linked to the quality of traffic flow in the HOV lane.100 In order to maintain a
Level of Service C or better, the fee is recalculated every 6 minutes. As a result, the toll
may be different at the same time on different days, depending on traffic levels. The
current toll is displayed prior to the point where a motorist must decide between using the
premium lanes and the regular lanes. The toll generally varies in 25 cents increments, and
under normal traffic conditions usually varies from $0.50 to $4.00. Under the original
project protocols, tolls could not exceed preset limits for any time period, except during
periods of extreme congestion, when the price could go as high as $8.00. Subsequent
refinements also included discounts during shoulder-of-peak hours in order to encourage
more traffic spreading.101
One result of the shift to electronic pricing is that it made it easier for drivers to
make occasional use of the premium lanes. Overall, traffic volume increased on the
premium lanes increased steadily during both the ExpressPass and FasTrak phases,
without adversely affecting the level of service of the HOV lane.102 Moreover, growth in
traffic on the HOV lane accounted for most of the growth in traffic volume on the I15
during the demonstration period.103 As a result of the success of the FasTrak
demonstration, when the demonstration period ended in 1999, state legislators approved
the continued operation of the project. A public opinion survey of users and non-users of
the fast track lane, conducted in 2001, also reported strong support for the express lanes
project. Interestingly, this support held true not just for FasTrak users, but also among
non-users and across socioeconomic groups.104
One reason for the public support for the FasTrak program may lie in the use
made of the revenue for the express lane. By 1999, it was generating approximately $1.2
million in annual revenue, approximately half of which was devoted to public transit.105
With these revenues, a new bus service, connecting with the San Diego LRT system, was
implemented in March 1997. During the demonstration period, the bus ran every 30
minutes during peak periods, and every 60 minutes during off peak and midday hours.
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3.

SR91 Express Lanes, Orange County, California

The SR91 Express Lanes (91X) are ten miles of four-lane divided toll highway
built in the median of the Riverside Freeway (SR91) in Orange County. They are
separated from SR91 by barriers and there are no on or off ramps. Since this route is the
only freeway connecter between Orange and Riverside counties, this portion of SR91 is
one of the most heavily congested sections of highway in California, with the original
four lanes in each direction (8 in total) carrying in excess of 200 vehicles per day, and
peak period delays averaging 20 to 40 minutes and sometimes exceeding 50 minutes.106
Although an original plan for the expansion of SR91 had called for the
construction of one lane each way for high-occupancy vehicles, a new agreement with the
private operator provided for the construction of two additional lanes each way with a
toll.107 While the original lanes remain free of charge for all users, drivers must pay to use
the Express lanes. The tolls are collected electronically, based on a published schedule.
The tolls vary by time of day and day of week, as well as direction of travel. In order to
provide the private operator with as much flexibility as possible, it is free to set toll rates
as it sees fit, within the constraints of a maximum financial return of 17 percent, beyond
which revenues are devoted to state and local highway projects.108
As a result of this flexibility, the toll schedule has changed greatly since the SR91
toll lanes opened in 1995. At that time there were five different tolls ranging from $0.25
during off-peak hours to $2.50 during peak hours. By 2001, the tolls ranged from $1.00
to $4.75, with 16 different toll amounts charged based on time and day of the week.
Initially, there was an exemption from paying the toll for motorcycles and highoccupancy vehicles (3+), though this was eliminated in 1998 and high-occupancy
vehicles were obliged to pay to use the Express lane at a discounted (50%) rate.109
While the Express lanes account for 33 percent of the SR91’s capacity (4 of
SR91’s 12 lanes), they only account for 14 percent of daily traffic. This is not entirely
surprising since they offer relatively little advantage over the free lanes during noncongested periods of the day. During peak periods, on the other hand, the Express Lanes
carry 33 percent of total traffic volume, or their proportionate share.110 As a result of the
expansion of capacity resulting from the construction of the Express Lanes, average peak
period delays fell from over 30 minutes on the free lanes to less than 10 minutes.111
Interestingly, despite the fact that the SR91 toll lanes carry the same volume per lane as
the free lanes during congested hours, traffic moves at free flow speeds, while the free
lanes move at 30 mph or less.112 One explanation for this phenomenon may be that the
peak period pricing helps keep traffic volume from pushing traffic density out of a
relatively stable and efficient flow.113 An alternative explanation may be that trucks are
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excluded from the Express Lanes (in order to keep down maintenance costs), which may
result in a more efficient traffic flow.114
It is also interesting to examine who uses the Express Lanes. A 1997 survey
reported that nearly 90 percent of peak period travelers along SR91 had an Express Lane
transponder, but most did not do so everyday; indeed nearly half of toll lane users drove
in the toll lane once a week or less, while less than one third used it on a daily basis.
Perhaps not surprisingly, travelers with long commutes reported using the toll lanes more
frequently than those with shorter commutes.115 Similarly, high-income travelers (with
incomes in excess of $100,000 per year) were two and a half times more likely to use the
Express Lanes than those from the lower income group (with incomes below $40 000 per
year). Still, despite this discrepancy, 20 percent of the lower income group reported
making using the toll lanes on their most recent trip.116
B. Cordon Pricing
Like variable tolls for the use of roads and other facilities such as bridges and
tunnels, cordon pricing represents another means of congestion pricing. In effect, this
system is essentially an admission charge to a given congested area (usually a central
business district) during certain (usually peak) hours. An alternative way to think of
cordon pricing is as a toll on an entire area, instead of only on one facility or lane. This
section considers four examples of cordon pricing: in Singapore, Norway, London and
Rome.
1.

Singapore

The earliest cordon pricing scheme was Singapore’s central area pricing scheme.
The area-licensing scheme (ALS) was originally implemented as part of the Singaporean
government’s policy to restrict vehicle ownership and use. The ALS method was
originally chosen over traditional forms of road pricing such as road tolls or higher
parking charges because the crowded city did not have enough space for toll stations in
the city center, and a high proportion of through traffic and chauffeur driven cars made
parking charges ineffective.117 The original scheme charged vehicles $60 (Singapore)
(about $27 US at the time) per month to enter the central area of the city during morning
hours. Travel outside of morning hours (7:30 to 9:30 am originally) or in a taxi or
vehicle with four or more passengers was free. Entry was restricted to 30 entry points,
marked by gantries and flashing lights, beyond these entry points, vehicles had to display
their brightly coloured licenses in their windshields, or face a $50 (Singapore) fine. At
the same time, a shuttle bus service was created between new park and ride spaces
outside the zone and the city center in order to provide an alternative to commuters.118
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The initial impact of the ALS on traffic patterns was quite dramatic. In the three
months after the introduction of the scheme, vehicle traffic fell by 44 percent during the
morning peak hours, from 74,000 vehicles to 41,200. The decline in car traffic was even
more dramatic, falling from 42,500 during the morning rush hour to 11,400 – a 73
percent decline.119 Most of the reduction in traffic was due to travelers shifting to
carpooling and public transit. Some of the reduction was also caused by a shift in travel
times outside of the morning hours, which resulted in some congestion after 9:30.120
On the other hand, the diversion of through traffic to the ring bypass road led to a
decrease in average speeds on the periphery of the zone. While bus speeds in the ring
increased, they did not improve on the radial routes.121 As well, household surveys did
not demonstrate any significant change in average travel times, except for those resulting
from a shift in travel mode (i.e. from car to bus or high-occupancy vehicle).122
This is not to suggest that the initial Singapore Area Licensing Scheme was a
failure. Although travel times did not improve as much as expected following the
introduction of the area-pricing scheme, they could have become worse. Indeed, while
the total volume of traffic (during the morning peak) increased by 24 percent between
1975 and 1988, the total number of vehicles registered in Singapore increased by 73
percent – suggesting that, absent road pricing, congestion and travel times could have
been much worse. Moreover, many of the earlier problems were alleviated by significant
new investment in both ring roads to deal with through traffic and improved public transit
to reduce commuting times.123
More recently, in 1998, Singapore replaced the paper-based Area Licensing
Scheme, with a fully automated Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) scheme. The new system
uses in-vehicle transponder units which use stored-value CashCards (in part because they
provided better privacy protection) to make payments. The initial cost of establishing the
ERP system was relatively high, approximately $110 million (US 1998), in part because
this included the cost not only the cost of new equipment for the overhead gantry points,
but also the cost of the 1.1 million transponder units which were initially given away free
of charge.124
The new ERP scheme was a much more subtle and sophisticated scheme than the
previous ALS arrangement. The new scheme allows drivers to pay as they go, instead of
having to pay a monthly fee. While the restricted zone entry tolls apply on weekdays
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from 7:30 AM to 7:00 PM, the actual fee charged varies from free (between 10:00 AM
and 12:00 PM) to $2.50 (Singapore) (from 8:30AM to 9:00 AM) according to a fixed
schedule.125 The new scheme also includes morning peak tolls on the radial and
peripheral highways which lead into and around the city center. As with the tolls in the
restricted zone, these tolls vary by time of day, with changes every half hour. In both
cases the purpose of the tolls was not to generate revenue, but to manage traffic.126
On the whole, the new ERP system seems to have been successful. Following its
introduction in 1998, daily traffic volumes fell by 20 to 24 percent compared to the year
before the new scheme was introduced, while average speeds in the restricted zone rose
from 30-35 km/h to 40-45 km/h. There also appears to have been some peak spreading,
as drivers took advantage of lower tolls before and after the peak hours.127
2.

Norway

In Norway, the cities of Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim introduced cordon pricing
regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the form of tolls that drivers must pay to
enter the city.128 Because of the unique geography of Norway’s cities, there were
relatively few entry points into these three cities, allowing them to use toll stations as a
means of restricting entry.129 All three cities use a combination of automatic and manual
toll booths, as well as electronic toll payment systems.130
Since Norwegian law requires that tolls be used as a means of road financing, not
traffic management, the pricing schemes in all three cities have been relatively
unsophisticated. In Oslo, for example, the toll is set at a relatively low level in order to
maximize revenue, and does not vary with time of day.131 Bergen and Trondheim, on the
other hand, have somewhat more sophisticated pricing schemes. In Bergen, there are free
periods during which drivers are not charged to enter the city (nighttime and weekends).
Trondheim includes not only a free period (also evenings and weekends), but also
charges a slightly higher toll during the morning rush hour.132
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The effectiveness of these toll rings in reducing traffic volumes and congestion
has largely depended on the extent to which rates vary by time of day. In Oslo, where the
prices were fixed, the effect of the toll ring on traffic volumes was relatively small, and
largely affected off-peak hours.133 In Bergen and Trondheim, on the other hand, there has
been a substantial shift in travel from peak to off-peak hours due to variable prices,.134
Trondheim also reported a 7 percent increase in public transit ridership during peak
hours. While the public was initially hostile to the toll ring concept, moreover, support
for the entire Trondheim package of the toll ring combined with road and public transit
improvements financed by the toll revenue was much more positive.135
3.

London

The most recent, and most widely discussed, example of area pricing is the
Central London Congestion Charge, which was introduced in 2003 as a means of
promoting public transportation, reducing congestion, and improving the environment. 136
The actual congestion charge had a relatively simple design, akin to the original Area
License Scheme in Singapore but with more advanced technology.137 The scheme
charges vehicles a flat fee of £5 per day to enter the Central London area between 7:00
AM and 6:30 PM, Monday to Friday.138 To provide commuters with an alternative to
driving, introduction of the charge was accompanied by the introduction of 300 new
buses in London as well as other transit enhancements – which had the not
inconsequential benefit of reducing public opposition to the charge. The charge is
enforced using an automatic number recognition technology that uses cameras set up on
the boundary and within the central zone.139
Although the Central London Congestion Charge has only been in effect since
2003, the initial results have been promising. After the first three months of operation,
average traffic speeds inside the restricted zone had increased by 37 percent over the
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average of the previous year (to 17 km/h from 13km/h) while journey times on round
trips to and from the zone had fallen by 13 percent. Congestion fell by 40 per cent during
charging hours compared to previous year, while then number of vehicles within the zone
had fallen by 16 percent. Bus speed in and around the zone also increased by
approximately 7 percent and excess passenger wait times fell by one third.140 Recent
studies suggest that these figures are not temporary. Furthermore, there has not been a
significant increase in traffic volumes on the inner ring road, or elsewhere outside of the
zone, and where traffic volumes have increased they do not appear to have caused a
significant increase in traffic congestion.141 In addition despite widespread concerns that
there would be resistance to paying the fee, this concern has not been borne out.142
Similarly, concerns amongst businesses in the charging zone that the scheme would deter
customers appear to have been overstated, although the evidence is mixed.143
4.

Rome

Similar area pricing schemes have been considered in Italy. In the 1990’s many
Italian cities, including Rome, experimented with various forms of traffic management in
their city centers. A 1989 Italian law allows municipalities to restrict the stationing and
the traffic of vehicles in urban areas in order to protect health, the environment, and
historical areas.144 In 1998 Rome introduced a system where outside drivers could
purchase a yearly pass for 320 Euro. Subsequently, in 2001, the city government
introduced an automatic access control system that uses a combination of on-vehicle
transponders and optical cameras to monitor entry into the zone. The system is currently
enforced between 6:30 am and 6:00 pm on weekdays, and between 2:00 and 6:00 pm on
Saturdays.145 As a result of the new pricing scheme traffic during peak hours has been
reduced by 10 to 20 percent, and vehicle emissions have declined.146
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C. Distance-Based Charges
A final method of road pricing involves directly charging vehicles for the
distances they travel with prices varying by vehicle weight. To the extent that these
charges reflect external costs to maintain roads and highways, they attempt to achieve
directly what fuel taxes aim to achieve indirectly. From another perspective, distancebased pricing is equivalent to simply tolling the entire road network. Unlike toll facilities
or cordon pricing schemes, comprehensive distance-based pricing systems do not allow
vehicles to avoid road user charges by shifting to alternative, non-charged, routes since
all travel is charged under a comprehensive system.
The earliest example of a direct distance-based road charge is the Swedish Kilometer
tax on diesel vehicles. The tax was explicitly intended to reflect the real road
infrastructure costs and externalities of each vehicle. As a result, the rates charges varied
by vehicle type, weight, and the number of axles.147 The tax was collected using a
mechanical counter that was linked to the vehicle’s odometer. At the end of every tax
period (usually every four months), the vehicle’s owner was required to stamp a card in
the counter and send it to the Traffic Safety Bureau which would then issue a bill based
on the kilometer count. One of the problems with this system was that it led to
considerable evasion and required a significant degree of administrative effort. Another
problem, which ultimately led to the downfall of the tax, was how to deal with foreign
vehicles which were not equipped with the counter.148
A more modern incarnation of the Swedish kilometer tax is the Swiss heavy
vehicle fee.149 First introduced in 2001, this tax replaced an existing flat rate charging
system. The new system charges vehicles on the basis of distance traveled, vehicle
weight, and vehicle emissions. Currently, the average rate is approximately 1 cent per km
ton traveled, although this is expected to be increased gradually to 1.8 cents per km ton
traveled by 2007.150 The fee is calculated and collected using an onboard monitor
connected to the vehicle’s tachometer. Distance traveled is recorded on a smart card that
is then sent to the authorities that issue a bill. In order to prevent tampering and fraud, the
onboard unit also records GPS readings in order to verify the distance traveled. 151
Early reports about the effects of the heavy good vehicle fee have been positive.
In order to reduce the costs of driving, fleet owners have started to shift towards more
amongst area businesses. See Mario Di Carlo, Road Charging in London, Prepared for the European
Council of Minister of Transport and Transport for London International Conference “Managing Transport
Demand Through User Charges: Experience to Date” (London, 23 January 2004) [Di Carlo, Road
Charging] at 16; and Eggers, Samuel, and Monk, supra note 137 at 33.
147
INFRAS Consulting Group, Variabilisation and Differentiation Strategies in Road Taxation:
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis: Final Report, Prepared for the ECMT Group on Transport and
Environment (2000) at 192, available online at http://www1.oecd.org/cem/pub/pubpdf/RdTax.pdf.
148
Ultimately the tax was phased out in 1993 as part of an effort to harmonize Sweden’s policies with those
of the European Union. See ibid. at 192-93
149
Germany and the UK have promised to introduce similar systems in 2005 and 2008 respectively, “The
road tolls for thee” The Economist (12 June 2004) 30 at 30.
150
Hans Werder, Impact of the Heavy Vehicle Fee Central Pillar of the Swiss Transport Policy, Prepared
for the European Council of Minister of Transport and Transport for London International Conference
“Managing Transport Demand Through User Charges: Experience to Date”, (London, 23 January 2004) at
3.
151
“The road tolls for thee”, supra note 149 at 30-32.
25

fuel-efficient and more appropriately sized vehicles (previously, fleet owners often used
over-sized vehicles). A related development has been increased productivity in the
trucking sector, as fleet owners have worked on reducing the number of trips made by
empty trucks.152
Another result has been a decline in the number of heavy vehicles on the road.
After increasing at an average rate of 7 percent prior to the introduction of the new taxing
scheme, the number of trucks on the road declined by 4 percent in 2001 and 3 percent in
2002, and appears to have stabilized in 2003. This change is likely due to the increased
productivity brought about by the new tax, as well as regulatory changes introduced as
part of the new tax, which allowed trucks to carry more weight (from 28 to 40 tons). In
addition, overall traffic levels, which had been increasing steadily at a rate of up to 10
percent a year prior to the new fee, appear to have stabilized.153
IV. Conclusion
The theoretical arguments in Part II of this paper suggest that optimally designed
road user charges can promote economic efficiency and fairness – ensuring that road
users value their use of the road system at an amount equal to or greater than the
additional costs attributable to this use, and reflecting a benefit principle of tax fairness
according to which persons should pay for the road system in proportion to their actual
use of this system. The various examples of road pricing arrangements in Part III of this
paper demonstrate that economically sensible road pricing is not just a theoretical
concept, but a practical possibility that can be achieved through various kinds of fees,
taxes, and direct user charges.
In practice, the choice among different road pricing arrangements should depend
on the context in which it is introduced. For example, while toll facilities with variable
pricing make considerable sense for limited access highways or lanes or other facilities
such as bridges and tunnels, it is less practical for urban surface roads where enforcement
costs would be prohibitive. On the other hand, toll lanes have a certain political appeal as
a means of both financing road construction and expansion since they often allow
governments to finance these network improvements without up-front capital costs, while
drivers “get something” (improved facilities) in exchange for the toll – thereby reducing
public opposition. Crucially, new electronic payments systems have made it easier and
less expensive to bill drivers without space requirements for toll plazas and without
disrupting traffic flows.
In other contexts, such as urban city centers, toll facilities will likely be less
appropriate. Depending on the geography and urban form, however, some form of cordon
pricing may be appropriate. For example, urban areas with limited access points due to
their geographic features may be able to adopt toll rings similar to those used in Norway.
Alternatively, cities where bridges or tunnels play a significant role as access routes into
the city may be able to adopt a quasi-cordon system, akin to the toll on facilities in
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Manhattan. The feasibility and effective of more elaborate cordon pricing schemes akin
to those used in Singapore or London will also depend on the urban form of a given city.
In these circumstances, experience indicates that cordon pricing schemes can be very
effective at promoting efficient traffic levels. To be truly effective, however,
comprehensive cordon pricing schemes require the presence of viable alternatives such as
public transit or free (or discounted) travel during off-peak hours. Improving public
transit or allowing free or discounted travel during off-peak hours also improves the
political feasibility of these schemes by allowing voters to avoid the charge by changing
their behaviour. Such arrangements can also minimize possible adverse redistributive
effects.
Finally, given the emergence of new technology, direct distance-based road
charging is increasingly feasible. While this approach is, at least in the immediate future,
likely to be limited to heavy goods vehicles rather than private passenger vehicles, it can
significantly improve amounts that these vehicles must pay for external costs of
driving.154 Combined with reductions in other less efficient means of road charging, such
as fuel taxes, might also limit the extent of political opposition to such charges.
While the most practical method of road pricing in any context necessarily
depends on patterns of road use and geography, as well as political constraints, the
theoretical arguments and practical examples in this paper suggest that Canadian
governments should and could increase the extent to which they rely on direct charges for
the use of Canada’s roads and highways.
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